We study price posting with undirected search in a search-theoretic monetary model with divisible money and divisible goods. Ex ante homogeneous buyers experience match specific preference shocks in bilateral trades. The shocks follow a continuous distribution and the realization of the shocks is private information. We show that generically there exists a unique price posting monetary equilibrium. In equilibrium, each seller posts a continuous pricing schedule that exhibits quantity discounts. Buyers spend only when they have high enough preferences. As their preferences are higher, they spend more till they become cash constrained. Since inflation reduces the future purchasing power of money and the value of retaining money, buyers tend to spend their money faster in response to higher inflation. In particular, more buyers choose to spend money and buyers spend on average a higher fraction of their money. The model naturally captures the hot potato effect of inflation along both the intensive margin and the extensive margin.
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Introduction
We build a search theoretic monetary model where sellers post prices and buyers engage in undirected search. The framework is based on Lagos and Wright (2005) and Rocheteau and Wright (2005) . Search is undirected in the sense that buyers observe the posted prices only after being matched with sellers. Price posting with undirected search (hereafter price posting) is an important pricing mechanism to study because it captures the characteristics of many daily exchanges. 1 In many occasions, buyers randomly enter a store, read the price labels and decide whether or not to make a purchase.
In the search theoretic monetary literature, it has been a challenge to generate equilibria with valued …at money under price posting. With a positive nominal interest rate, when buyers hold money, they make a costly ex ante investment. The existence of monetary equilibria hinges critically on the condition that buyers extract some trading surplus during monetary exchange. In a typical monetary model with price posting, sellers propose the terms of trade to extract the entire trading surplus. Monetary equilibria unravel as a result.
To generate monetary equilibria under price posting, we introduce private information about match speci…c preference shocks that a¤ect buyers'marginal utility of consumption.
Private information about preferences prevents the seller from extracting all the trading surplus and restores monetary equilibria. We show that when the preference shock follows a continuous distribution, there exists a unique monetary equilibrium with a continuum of prices. The model provides a useful framework to study the seller's pricing decision, the buyer's spending pattern, and the e¤ects of in ‡ation on these behaviors.
In equilibrium, the seller posts a non-linear pricing schedule that exhibits quantity discounts: lower unit prices for purchases of larger sizes. Quantity discounts are frequently observed in practice. The traditional explanation is that the unit cost of producing and/or selling a larger quantity is lower. In our model, quantity discounts exist even when the unit cost is constant, and private information about preferences is the key to generating quantity discounts.
After the preference shock is realized, buyers spend money only when they have high enough preferences. When preferences are higher, buyers increase spending till they are cash constrained. The model provides an intuitive explanation for the "hot potato" e¤ect of in ‡ation, i.e., in ‡ation induces buyers to spend money faster. Buyers with low preferences retain all or part of their money for future spending. As in ‡ation rises, the bene…t of waiting for future purchases diminishes. Therefore, less buyers choose to retain all of their money, which means more buyers start spending money. Among those who retain part of their money before, higher in ‡ation induces them to purchase more goods and spend a higher fraction of their money.
There have been earlier attempts to study price posting within the search theoretic monetary framework. As in our paper, the key to the existence of a monetary equilibrium under price posting is private information about match speci…c preference shocks. Jafarey and Masters (2003) and Curtis and Wright (2004) study price posting using the indivisible money model of Trejos and Wright (1995) . In Curtis and Wright (2004) , there are multiple ( 2) realizations of the preference shock and in equilibrium, sellers post at most two prices. Jafarey and Masters (2003) allow the preference shock to follow a uniform distribution.
Interestingly, there is a single price posted in equilibrium. More recently, Ennis (2008) extends price posting to a divisible money framework as in Lagos and Wright (2005) . He speci…es a distribution of preference shocks that takes two values, and shows that sellers post a single price in equilibrium.
These earlier models are characterized by a simple pricing schedule and spending pattern and as a consequence, are not suitable for analyzing how in ‡ation a¤ects pricing and spending decisions. In particular, there exists "the law of two prices" as emphasized by Curtis and Wright (2004) . Furthermore, a common feature shared by all the previous papers is that buyers always spend all their money once they are matched with sellers. Our paper shows that "the law of two prices" breaks down in a model with divisible money and a continuous distribution of preference shocks. The model generates richer (and more realistic) pricing schedule and spending pattern, and is suitable to study the e¤ects of in ‡ation on these behaviors.
The hot potato e¤ect has been examined in several recent papers. In Lagos and Rocheteau (2005), in ‡ation may increase the buyer's trading surplus. As a result, buyers increase search intensity and spend money faster. The explanation, however, is not robust and applies only when the terms of trade are determined by competitive search and when in ‡ation is at low levels. Ennis (2009) assumes that sellers have more opportunities to rebalance money holdings than buyers. In ‡ation induces buyers to search harder for sellers to o¤-load their money. Liu et al. (forthcoming) consider free entry by buyers in monetary exchange. In ‡ation reduces buyers'trading surplus, so fewer buyers choose to enter, which increases the matching probability for those who do enter. In their model, buyers are able to spend faster simply because they have more opportunities to trade, not because they actively try to get rid of their money. In addition, the result is sensitive to the assumption of free entry by buyers. The result is reversed if we consider free entry by sellers. Nosal (forthcoming) assumes that accepting a current trade reduces (exogenously) the probability of future trading. In ‡ation reduces the value of future trading and buyers are more likely to accept current trades.
Compared with the existing literature, our explanation is the closest to the narrative description of the hot potato e¤ect of in ‡ation. 2 The hot potato e¤ect is robust and exists at all levels of in ‡ation. A novel result from the model is that it captures the hot potato e¤ect along both the intensive margin (those who spent before spend more) and the extensive margins (those who did not spend before start spending).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the environment. In Section 3, we characterize the monetary equilibrium when the preference shock follows a uniform distribution. Section 4 examines the e¤ects of in ‡ation and rationalizes the hot potato e¤ect of in ‡ation. In Section 5, the model is extended to allow for a more general continuous distribution of preference shocks. We discuss some related work in Section 6 and Section 7 concludes. The technical proofs of Lemma 1 and results in Section 5 are provided in the Appendix.
Environment
The model is based on Rocheteau and Wright (2005) . Time is discrete and runs from 0 to
A decentralized market (DM) and a centralized market (CM) open sequentially in each
period. The discount factor between two periods is 0 < < 1. There are two permanent types of agents: buyers and sellers distinguished by their roles in the DM. There is one nonstorable good in each market: a CM good and a DM good.
The CM is a centrally located competitive spot market. In the CM, all agents can consume or produce the CM good x. The utility of consuming x units of the CM good is
x. If x < 0, it means that the agent produces and incurs disutility.
In the DM, agents are anonymous. Buyers and sellers are randomly matched and the matching function is such that one buyer meets one seller with probability 1. 3 Buyers are those who want to consume but cannot produce. Sellers can produce but do not want to consume. This generates a lack of double coincidence of wants problem, which together with anonymity, makes money essential as the medium of exchange. 4 For a seller, the disutility of producing q units of the DM good is c(q) with c(0) = 0, c 0 > 0 and c 00 0. By consuming q units of the DM good, a buyer's utility is eu(q);where e 0 is a preference parameter that determines the buyer's marginal utility of consumption. The function u(q) satis…es u(0) = 0, u 0 > 0 > u 00 and u 0 (0) = 1. All buyers are ex ante identical before being matched with sellers. Ex post, however, they are subject to match speci…c preference shocks and become heterogeneous during their matches with sellers. The realization of e follows a uniform distribution on the interval [0; 1]. Buyers hold private information about the realization of e. It is straightforward that eu 0 (q e ) = c 0 (q e ) characterizes the …rst-best the price should rise meanwhile." 3 The model is abstract from matching friction merely for simplicity. Allowing for a general matching function will not change our main results. 4 Research on micro-founded monetary theory studies the frictions that make money essential. The consensus in the literature (see Kocherlakota 1998a, b) is that money is essential when three frictions exist: lack of double coincidence of wants, lack of commitment and private information about individual trading histories. Here we capture the last two frictions by "anonymity".
allocation q e for e 2 [0; 1].
The terms of trade in the DM are determined by price posting with undirected search.
Before a buyer and a seller meet, the seller posts the terms of trade which consist of a menu of price-quantity pairs, and the buyer does not observe the posting. Once they are matched, the buyer sees the posted terms of trade and decides which price-quantity pair to take from the menu. As in other papers that study price posting, buyers may choose not to trade at all after they are matched.
Fiat money is supplied by the monetary authority. Money supply M t grows at a constant rate so that M t = M t 1 . New money is used to …nance a lump-sum transfer to buyers at the beginning of each CM. Let T t = ( 1)M t 1 be the amount of nominal transfer to each buyer.
Price Posting Equilibrium
Throughout this paper, we assume that money balances are observable. To solve the equilibrium, we …rst analyze choices in the CM and then move back to consider choices in the DM.
Decision Making in the CM
In the CM, agents rebalance their money holdings by trading money for the CM good, x, or vice versa. We …rst consider a buyer's problem. Let W b (m) denote the buyer's value function while entering the CM with m units of money. Let V b (m + ) be the value function for the buyer in the DM of the next period, wherem + is the buyer's choice of money holding to enter the DM. We have
where is the value of money in the CM. De…ning z = m, = T andẑ + = +m+ ; we can rewrite the buyer's problem in real terms as
Note that due to quasilinear preferences, the choice ofẑ + is independent of z and W b (z) is linear in z with dW b (z)=dz = 1. The …rst-order condition is
For a seller with z units of real money balance upon entering the CM, let W s (z) be his value function. It is a standard result that when the nominal interest rate is positive, the seller spends all the money accumulated in the previous DM on x and carries 0 money balance to the following DM. The seller's value function is given by W s (z) = z + V s (0):
Decision Making in the DM
In the DM, the seller posts a menu of price-quantity pairs (q e ; z e ) for all e 2 [0; 1]. We assume that the seller can observeẑ, the buyer's money balance while entering into the DM, so that the seller's posting may depend onẑ. The matching function is such that each buyer meets a seller with probability 1. Upon matching, the match speci…c preference shock is realized and is the buyer's private information. After seeing the seller's posting, the buyer decides whether to trade or not, and if he decides to trade, which (q e ; z e ) to take. 
s.t.
eu(q e ) z e eu(q e 0 ) z e 0 for all e; e 0 2 [0; 1], eu(q e ) z e 0.
(NC)
The four constraints are the non-negativity constraints (NC), the cash constraints (CC), the incentive constraints (IC) and the participation constraints (PC), respectively. 5 The formulation of the ICs and the PCs uses the property that W b (z) is linear in z.
In the following, we simplify the seller's problem (1) in several steps. First, note that we can ignore the PCs for all e > 0 because they are implied by the PC for e = 0 and the ICs. In addition, the PC binds for buyers with e = 0. Second, we use the result from Mas-Collell, Winston and Green (1995, Proposition 23.D.1, page 888) to …nd the necessary and su¢ cient conditions to guarantee that the ICs are satis…ed. Then we replace the ICs with these conditions and convert the seller's problem into an optimal control problem. 6 5 It may not be obvious at …rst glance why the seller should take the buyer's cash constraint into consideration: he may include some (q; z) pairs with z >ẑ to help to align the buyer's incentives. However, a second thought makes it clear that such choices will not be e¤ective. Pairs with z >ẑ are beyond the means of the buyer and will be disregarded by the buyer, and therefore, will be irrelevant for the purpose of incentive alignment. As a result, when the seller posts terms of trade, only pairs with z ẑ will be included. 6 A similar technique is also adopted in Faig and Jerez (2006) and Thomas (2002) . In Faig and Jerez,
Let v e eu(q e ) z e denote the buyer's ex post trading surplus when the realization of the preference shock is e. The ICs are equivalent to:
dv e =de = u(q e ):
Using 
The solution to the seller's problem is a schedule of (q e ; z e ) e2[0;1] as a function ofẑ.
where q 1 solves u 0 (q 1 ) = c 0 (q 1 ). Lemma 1 fully characterizes the seller's optimal pricing schedule as a function ofẑ.
Lemma 1 For any givenẑ z, the optimal solution [q e (ẑ); z e (ẑ); v e (ẑ)] for all e 2 [0; 1] to the seller's pricing problem is unique and is characterized by:
(ii) For e 2 [e 0 ;ê], q e : (2e 2ê +ê
the technique is used to solve the seller's problem in a competitive search model where buyers have private information about the realization of preference shocks. Thomas uses the technique to solve a static decision problem of seller facing a consumer with unknown demand and a budget constraint. 7 Note that the objective function of the seller is rewritten by using the property that W s (z) is linear in z: 8 As discussed in the proof of Lemma 1 in the Appendix, z is the amount of real cash balances charged to a buyer who has the highest realization of the preference shock and buys the e¢ cient amount. If buyers hold more than z real cash balances, they will not be cash constrained in any realization of e. It will be clear later in this section that with a positive nominal interest rate, buyers will chooseẑ < z:
v e : v e = eu(q) ẑ;
(iv) e 0 andê are given byẑ
Forẑ > z, (7) is replaced byê = 1:
Proof. See the Appendix
Monetary Equilibrium
Given the seller's optimal pricing schedule in the DM, we are now ready to derive the buyer's demand for money in the CM. As the buyer knows how (q e ; z e ; v e ) depends onẑ, the buyer's value function in the DM is
where S(ẑ) R 1 0 v e (ẑ)de is the buyer's expected trading surplus in the DM. In the CM, the buyer's choice ofẑ + satis…es
We will focus on the steady state equilibrium whereẑ is constant and = + = . The equilibriumẑ is given by
The nominal interest rate is determined by the Fisher equation, i = = 1. As long as > or the nominal interest rate is positive, the cash constraint will bind for buyers with high enough preferences, so the optimalẑ cannot be greater than z. The buyer's choice of z from (9), together with the seller's optimal pricing schedule, completes the description of the monetary equilibrium under price posting. (4), (5), (6), (7) and (8) Proof. We …rst show that knowing how (q e ; z e ) depends onẑ, buyers choose a uniqueẑ in the CM. Di¤erentiating S(ẑ),
where dq=dẑ and dê=dẑ are solved by di¤erentiating (5) and (7) In price posting equilibrium, all buyers choose the sameẑ in the CM. As long as < 1,
we haveẑ > 0; andê; e 0 and (ê e 0 ) are all positive. A continuum of prices is observed when preference shocks follow a uniform distribution. The number of prices observed in equilibrium is measured byê e 0 . This is in contrast to Ennis (2008) , where only a single price is observed with a two-point distribution of preference shocks. This is also di¤erent In equilibrium, buyers with e 2 [0; e 0 ] choose not to spend money and consume nothing. 9 Buyers in this group do not value consumption much. As a result, it is better for them to hold on to their money balances and wait for future consumption opportunities. 
The next proposition establishes that larger quantities are associated with lower per unit prices when the cost function is linear.
Proposition 2 Quantity discounts: when c(q) = q, d(z e =q e )=dq e < 0 for e 2 [e 0 ;ê].
The proof follows directly from (10) . This result appears to be consistent with the pricing strategy in reality. One common practice used by sellers is to o¤er quantity discounts, i.e., lower unit prices for larger purchases. The traditional explanation for quantity discounts is the economies of scale. Sellers charge low unit prices for large quantities because the unit cost for production and/or sale of larger quantities is lower. Here, quantity discounts are driven by private information about the buyer's preference and exist even if the unit cost is constant. To see this more clearly, consider the case where the sellers knows the buyer's preferences. In this situation, the seller o¤ers (q e ; z e ) to maximize c(q e ) + z e subject to eu(q e ) z e = 0. The solution to the problem is characterized by eu 0 (q e ) = c 0 (q e ) and z e = eu(q e ). In the absence of private information, z e =q e = eu(q e )=q e . There are two factors that determine the unit price: e and u(q e )=q e . The …rst factor induces quantity premium:
the seller charges a high price if he knows that the buyer likes the good very much. The second factor leads to quantity discounts and is due to diminishing marginal utility. When the seller knows the buyer's preference, the …rst factor may dominate so that the unit price may increase with e, or equivalently q e . The existence of private information prevents the seller from exploiting buyers with high preferences and the …rst factor disappears (note that in (10), the term before u(q e )=q e is constant for all e).
The result that private information may induce quantity discounts can also be found Price posting is also important for the existence of quantity discounts. If we change the trading protocol to buyer's take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers or competitive pricing, linear prices will be observed when the unit cost is constant. 10 
Hot Potato E¤ect of In ‡ation
In this economy, it is easy to verify that the Friedman rule cannot achieve the …rst-best allocation due to the hold-up problem. In ‡ation has a signi…cant e¤ect on the buyer's spending pattern. First, in ‡ation a¤ects the buyer's choice of real money balance or the budget constraint. Second, in ‡ation a¤ects the speed at which buyers spend money.
Proposition 3
The e¤ ects of in ‡ation on (ẑ; e 0 ;ê): dẑ=d < 0; de 0 =d < 0; and dê=d < 0.
Proof. Considerẑ = z. Asê = 1, it is straightforward that S 0 ( z) = 0. The optimalẑ satis…es S 0 (ẑ) + 1 = 0. Since we focus onẑ z, it implies that S 0 ( z) + 1 < 0 for > and ! from above. As S 0 (0) = 1, we know that S 0 (0) + 1 = 1. For 
Proposition 4
The e¤ ects of in ‡ation on (q e ; z e ; z e =ẑ) for e 2 [e 0 ;ê]: dq e =d > 0, dz e =d > 0, and d(z e =ẑ)=d > 0 if u 000 0 and c 000 0.
Proof. As dê=d < 0, proving dq e =d > 0 and dz e =d > 0 is equivalent to proving dq e =dê < 0 and dz e =dê < 0. We do this by proving d dqe de =dê < 0 and d dze de =dê < 0, or q e (e;ê) and z e (e;ê) are steeper for lower values ofê.
We …rst show that d dqe de =dê < 0. Use (3) that characterizes q e for e 2 [e 0 ;ê] to calculate dq e =de as (to simplify notations, we omit the arguments of the functions u( ) and 
As dz e =d > 0 and dẑ=d < 0, d(z e =ẑ)=d > 0.
Here, we have the standard result that in ‡ation decreases the demand for real money balances and makes the cash constraint more stringent. Besides that, the model provides an intuitive explanation about the "hot potato" e¤ect of in ‡ation, which means that buyers spend money faster when in ‡ation is higher. In price posting equilibrium, buyers with higher preferences spend more while those with lower preferences spend less and retain some money for future exchanges. In ‡ation reduces the future purchasing power of money and the bene…t of retaining money. Buyers respond by buying more goods and speeding up spending. The model can capture the hot potato e¤ect along both the extensive and intensive margins.
As shown in Proposition 3, in ‡ation reduces e 0 , implying that more buyers start spending money. Proposition 4 implies that for those who spend money, higher in ‡ation induces them to spend more money, captured by higher q e and z e =ẑ. It naturally follows that the aggregate speed of money spending de…ned as R e zê z de increases with in ‡ation. Refer to Figure 1 for a graphical illustration of the hot potato e¤ect of in ‡ation.
There are several recent attempts to rationalize the hot potato e¤ect of in ‡ation. Lagos and Rocheteau (2005) endogenize search intensity, and they show that in ‡ation may increase a buyer's trading surplus. As a result, buyers may search more intensively which increases the probability of spending. The problem is that the result holds only for low in ‡ation rates and a particular pricing mechanism -competitive search. Bargaining cannot deliver similar results because in ‡ation monotonically reduces the buyer's surplus in a match and thus the search intensity.
Ennis (2009) assumes that sellers have more opportunities to rebalance money holdings than buyers (i.e., they have more frequent access to the centralized market than buyers), in ‡ation makes buyers search harder to …nd sellers to o¤-load their money. In ‡ation reduces buyers'trading surplus, so fewer buyers choose to enter. For those who do enter, the matching probability becomes higher. Buyers are able to spend faster simply because they have more opportunities to trade, not because they actively try to get rid of their money. Furthermore, the result that the matching probability increases with in ‡ation depends on whether the free entry is assumed by buyers or sellers. For example, in Rocheteau and Wright (2005) , sellers pay the entry fee and in ‡ation monotonically reduces buyers'trading probability. To explain the hot potato e¤ect of in ‡ation, it is not clear that one should assume the entry fee is paid by buyers rather than by sellers.
In Nosal (forthcoming), it is assumed that accepting a current trade involves an exogenous cost that lowers the probability of future trading. In ‡ation reduces the value of future trading and people are more likely to accept a current trade. Our paper and Nosal (forthcoming) both emphasize that buyers spend faster in fear that money will lose purchasing power in the future due to in ‡ation. We provide a more integrated model and do not rely on assuming the exogenous reduction of future trading probability as a consequence of accepting a current trade. In our model, the cost of buying more today is less money to spend in the future.
Compared with the existing literature, the mechanism in our model is closest to the narrative description of the hot potato e¤ect: people rush to buy more and spend money faster in fear that the value of the money left in their pocket will depreciate quickly. The result that in ‡ation raises the quantity of purchases for some buyers is a rare result in monetary models. 11 Our model also generates a robust hot potato e¤ect that exists at all levels of in ‡ation. We provide an intuitive and integrated explanation without exogenous assumptions about who pays the entry fee, who has better access to the centralized market, or whether current trade reduces the probability of future trading. Finally, our model captures the hot potato e¤ect along both the extensive margin and the intensive margin.
Extension to More General Distributions
The above analysis assumes that the distribution of preference shocks follows a uniform distribution. In this section, we extend the model by allowing preference shocks to follow a more general continuous distribution. Let f (e) and F (e) denote the p.d.f. and the c.d.f. of the distribution, respectively. Without loss of generality, we still focus on e 2 [0; 1]. We assume that ef (e) is increasing in e, i.e., f (e) + ef 0 (e) > 0. 12 
Seller' s Price Posting Decision
The choice problems for buyers and sellers in each market remain the same as before. We …rst solve for the seller's optimal price-posting problem, takingẑ as given. Similar to the case with a uniform distribution, de…ne z as
where q 1 is de…ned as before and e 0 ; q x2[e 0 ;1] solves e 0 f (e 0 ) + F (e 0 ) = 1;
We characterize the solution to the seller's problem in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 For any givenẑ z, the optimal solution (q e ; z e ; v e ) for all e 2 [0; 1] to the seller's price-posting problem is unique and is characterized by 1 1 Exceptions are Peterson and Shi (2004) and Faig and Jerez (2006) . Both papers feature buyers having private information about match speci…c preference shocks. In ‡ation induces some buyers to purchase more goods. Perterson and Shi (2004) use the large household model of money and the terms of trade are determined by the buyer's take-it-or-leave-it o¤er. In Faig and Jerez (2006) , the terms of trade in the DM are determined by competitive search. 1 2 Alternatively, if the distribution has a monotonic hazard rate, i.e.,
increases e, all the results in this section go through. 
z e : z e =ẑ;
(iv) e 0 andê are given byê
Forẑ > z, (13) is replaced byê = 1. Proposition 5 The seller's optimal pricing schedule has the following properties: dê=dẑ > 0, dq=dẑ > 0, de 0 =dẑ > 0 and dq e =dẑ < 0 for e 2 [e 0 ;ê].
Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 6 Quantity discounts: when c(q) = q, d(z e =q e )=dq e < 0 for e 2 [e 0 ;ê].
Equilibrium
After deriving the seller's pricing schedule in the DM, we can solve the buyer's demand for money in the CM from (9) . The de…nition of a price posting equilibrium remains the same as in De…nition 1. Since S(ẑ) and S 0 (ẑ) do not directly depend on i, a unique monetary equilibrium exists for generic values of . Recall that ef (e) is increasing in e. From (14), one can show that 1 ê <êf (ê) + F (ê) and hence e 0 <ê. There is a continuum of prices observed in equilibrium, which con…rms that the law of two prices in Curtis and Wright (2004) cannot be generalized to a divisible money framework with a general continuous distribution.
Proposition 7
The e¤ ects of in ‡ation on (ẑ; e 0 ;ê): dẑ=d < 0; de 0 =d < 0 and dê=d < 0.
Proposition 8
The e¤ ects of in ‡ation on (q e ; z e ; z e =ẑ) for e 2 [e 0 ;ê]: dq e =d > 0, dz e =d > 0, and d(z e =ẑ)=d > 0 if u 000 0 and c 000 0 and f 0 (e) 0:
In ‡ation reduces buyers'choice of the real money balance. In ‡ation also induces more buyers to spend their money. The model with a more general distribution can still capture the hot potato e¤ect along the extensive margin. To show the hot potato e¤ect along the intensive margin, we need to impose the assumption that f 0 (e) 0.
To summarize, most of our results from a uniform distribution of preference shocks remain valid when the distribution of preference shocks is extended to a more general continuous distribution. The price-posting equilibrium captures commonly observed phenomena such as quantity discounts and the hot potato e¤ect of in ‡ation. It also veri…es that the divisibility of money matters: the law of two prices found in the indivisible money framework no longer holds when money becomes divisible.
Discussion
We study price posting with undirected search in this paper. Price posting is often combined with directed search in the literature. The key di¤erence between undirected search and directed search is that buyers observe the pricing schedule before they choose their money balances and can direct their search to a particular pricing schedule under directed search, whereas buyers have no information of the pricing schedule when they choose their money balances under undirected search.
Faig and Jerez (2006) study private information in a very similar environment except that undirected search is replaced by directed search, which is labelled as competitive search.
They show that there exists a continuum of price-quantity pairs in competitive search monetary equilibrium. Despite the similarity, there are some important di¤erences in the properties of these two equilibria.
Theoretically, compared to Faig and Jerez (2006) , the price posting equilibrium in our paper endogenously generates an extensive margin due to the existence of ex post participation constraints. 13 Our model predicts that in ‡ation induces more buyers to participate in trading, whereas all buyers always trade in competitive search equilibrium. As a result, in ‡ation a¤ects output and welfare in di¤erent ways. Under competitive search, in ‡ation a¤ects the economy through only the intensive margin and the Friedman rule completely removes the ine¢ ciency. Under undirected search, the e¤ect of in ‡ation is more complicated: it hurts the intensive margin, but improves the extensive margin by encouraging more buyers to trade.
Quantitatively, since sellers have the power to propose the pricing schedule, the holdup problem in price posting equilibrium is more severe than in competitive search equilibrium.
Using the consumption equivalence measure, we …nd that the welfare cost of 10% in ‡ation against the Friedman rule is 7:24%. 14 In contrast, the welfare cost of 10% in ‡ation against the Friedman rule in Faig and Jerez (2006) is less than 1%, which further shows that competitive search is a more e¢ cient pricing mechanism.
Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a search theoretic monetary model where sellers post prices and search is undirected. It contributes to the literature on price posting by considering a continuous distribution of the match speci…c preference shocks in a divisible money framework.
We show that there exists a unique monetary equilibrium under price posting. Unlike the predictions from the indivisible money framework or the divisible money framework with a two-point distribution of preference shocks, equilibrium is characterized by a continuum of price-quantity pairs and the law of two prices as emphasized in Curtis and Wright (2004) does not hold. Compared with earlier models of price posting, our model generates a richer pricing schedule and spending pattern.
The equilibrium pricing schedule exhibits quantity discounts, a commonly observed practice. The presence of private information about preferences implies that the seller prefers to o¤er lower unit prices to induce buyers with higher preferences to buy more even if the unit cost of production is constant.
In terms of the buyer's spending pattern, the model provides a natural explanation of the hot potato e¤ect of in ‡ation: buyers spend money faster as in ‡ation rises. In the presence of preference shocks, buyers start spending only if they have high enough preferences, and they spend more when they have higher preferences till they are cash constrained. Those with low preferences choose to retain some money for future spending. When in ‡ation is higher, fearing that their money will lose value quickly if they wait, buyers speed up spending. Among existing theories on the hot potato e¤ect, our explanation resembles most closely the narrative description of the phenomenon. We are also able to capture the hot potato e¤ect along both the extensive margin (more buyers start to spend) and the intensive margin (those who spent before spend more) at all levels of in ‡ation.
A Appendix
The appendix includes proofs for the seller's optimal pricing schedule when the shock follows a uniform distribution, and for all the results in section 5 where preference shocks follow more general continuous distributions.
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1: Seller' s Optimal Price Posting with a Uniform Distribution
Proof. We …rst disregard the IC1 dq e =de 0 (and we will impose it later) and …nd the condition that characterize the optimal choice of (q e ; z e ). 
e :ẑ eu(q e ) + v e 0; if > 0, then e = 0;
e : q e 0; if > 0, then e = 0.
The transversality condition is 1 v 1 = 0. In a monetary equilibrium, v 1 > 0 and 1 = 0.
Integrating d x =dx over the interval [e; 1], we have where the last step uses the transversality condition. Substituting e into (15),
Now we impose the constraint dq e =de 0 (and as a result dz e =de 0). Given this, we can consider the seller's problem in three regions of e divided by 0 e 0 ê 1.
Case (a)
. When e is small (e e 0 ), no exchange occurs or q e = z e = v e = 0. NC binds and CC is loose.
Case (b).
For intermediate values of e (e 0 e ê), neither NC nor CC binds, i.e., e = e = 0. In this case, (20) reduces to 15
which can be used to solve q e . Since u 00 < 0 c 00 , the solution to (21) satis…es dq e =de > 0.
Therefore, we can use (21) to characterize the solution of q e for e 0 e ê.
Case (c).
When e is high (e ê), the buyer is charged all his money holding, or z e =ẑ and q e =q: We can solveq from
In the next step, we will …nd the term ê in (21) and (22) as a function ofê. Since q e =q for all e >ê,q also solves
Combining (22) 
Together with the end-point conditions ê = 0 and 1 = 0, (24) gives rises to the following result 16
The …nal step to complete the solution to the seller's problem is to determine e 0 andê as functions ofẑ. Note that e 0 can be expressed as a function ofê and is determined by
As a result, it su¢ ces to …ndê as a function ofẑ. From (21) and the de…nition of v e ,ê is 1 5 Notice that since e = 0 for e 2 [0;ê], we have e = ê for e 2 [0;ê]. 1 6 We solve (24) by a guess-and-verify method. We guess that e = 1 + k=e 2 and …nd that k = ê 2 .
solved from 17ẑ
In general, it is possible thatê takes the corner solutionê = 1 (so that no buyer is cash constrained) whenẑ is large enough. This situation occurs whenẑ z with z given by (2).
A. 
eu(q e ) v e ẑ; (CC)
dv e =de = u(q e ); (IC2)
for all e 2 [0; 1].
To proceed, we …rst ignore the constraint dq e =de 0. We will impose the constraint later to …nd the solution. The Hamiltonian of the optimal control problem is H = [ c(q e ) + where e and e are the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the cash constraint and the 1 7 Integrating both sides of (21) 
Since dq e =de 0 (and as a result dz e =de 0), we can discuss the solution to the seller's problem by dividing e into three regions characterized by two threshold values of e, e 0 and e. We will consider three cases in the following.
Case (a).
For e e 0 , the NC binds and q e = z e = v e = 0.
Case (b). For e 2 [e 0 ;ê], neither NC nor CC binds or e = e = 0. (32) reduces to 18 [ef (e) + F (e) 1
Case (c). For e 2 [ê; 1], CC binds. In this case, z e =ẑ, q e =q withq solving
In the next step, we solve for ê as a function ofê. To do this, note that for e 2 (ê; 1), CC binds and q e =q solves
[ef (e) + F (e) 1 + e e e] u 0 (q) = f (e)c 0 (q)
Combining (34) and (35), we reacĥ
where we use e = d e de . Rewriting (36) as and
where C is a constant determined by the boundary condition 1 = 0:
We can solve ê as a function ofê by using (37) for e =ê:
Since ef (e) increases in e, the numerator of ê increases inê. It follows that ê decreases inê.
Finally, we will prove that dq e =de > 0 for e 2 [e 0 ;ê] to justify that the solution satis…es the constraint dq e =de 0. We rearrange the …rst-order condition for q e2[e 0 ;ê] as
As 1 e is decreasing in e, we only need to show that (e) = F (e) 1
ef (e) + ê ef (e) is increasing in e. Since ê < 1 F (ê) and f (e) + ef 0 (e) > 0,
Using the results above, the derivation of Proposition 6 is a straightforward exercise.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 5: Properties of Seller' s Optimal Pricing Schedule
, (34) can be rewritten '(ê) = c 0 (q) u 0 (q) . Di¤erentiate it with respect toê and we have dq dê = ' 0 (ê)(u 0 ) 2 c 00 u 0 c 0 u 00
Use (38) to rearrange '(ê) as
It is easy to show that ' 0 (ê) > 0. If then follows that dq=dê > 0:
Di¤erentiate (14) with respect toê and we have
2f (e 0 ) + ef (e 0 ) > 0:
Di¤erentiating (11) with respect toê gives
Di¤erentiate (13) with respect toẑ,
from which we derive dê dẑ = 1 
A.4 Proof of Proposition 6: Quantity Discounts
Proof. For e 2 [e 0 ;ê], q e is solved from (11) . Integrating both sides from e 0 to e, we have The associated money payment is z e = eu(q e ) where "_" represents "have the same sign as".
If c(q e ) is linear, c 0 (q e )q e = c(q e ). We have shown earlier that ê < 1 F (e) or 1
F (e) ê > 0. Since u 00 < 0, we have u 0 (q e )q e u(q e ) < 0: To prove the quantity discounts result, we only need to show that [f (
> 0 for x > e 0 (note the …rst-order condition with respect to q e ), we show that
A.5 Proof of Proposition 7: E¤ects of In ‡ation onẑ Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 4. As S 0 ( z) = 0, one can show that S 0 ( z) + 1 < 0 for > and ! from above. We again focus onẑ 2 [0; z]. For a generically uniqueẑ, it must be true that S 00 (ẑ) < 0. So 
A.6 Proof of Proposition 8: Hot Potato E¤ect
Proof. As dê=d < 0, proving dq e =d > 0 and dz e =d > 0 is equivalent to proving dq e =dê < 0 and dz e =dê < 0. We do this by proving d dqe de =dê < 0 and d dze de =dê < 0, or q e (e;ê) and z e (e;ê) are steeper for lowerê.
We …rst show d dqe de =dê < 0. Use (11) that characterizes q e for e 2 [e 0 ;ê] to calculate dq e =de as (to simplify notation, we omit the arguments of the functions u( ) and c( )): dq e de = u 02 c 00 u 0 c 0 u 00 1 +
The …rst term 2u 0 (c 00 u 0 c 0 u 00 ) u 02 (c 000 u 0 + c 00 u 00 c 00 u 00 c 0 u 000 ) (c 00 u 0 c 0 u 00 ) 2 dq e dê = 2u 0 (c 00 u 0 c 0 u 00 ) u 03 c 000 + u 02 c 0 u 000 (c 00 u 0 c 0 u 00 ) 2 dq e dê < 0 if c 000 < 0 and u 000 > 0:
The second term 1 +
Since both the …rst term and the second term of dq e =de (are positive and) decrease inê, d dqe de =dê < 0. Now we show d dze de =dê < 0. Remember that z e = eu 0 (q e )dq e =de, so dz e de = eu 03 c 00 u 0 c 0 u 00 1 +
The …rst term The second term is positive and decreases inê if f 0 0. Since both the …rst term and the second term of dz e =de (are positive and) decrease inê, d dze de =dê < 0. As dz e =d > 0 and dẑ=d < 0, d(z e =ẑ)=d > 0.
